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   We briefly introduce the financial crisis and the role played by 
mortgage-backed securities. Then we describe the controversy at issue: 
whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those 
securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take 
physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner 
specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, we analyze 
(i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house 
counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, 
in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to mitigate the 
controversy. Finally, we examine how the foregoing analysis can help to 
inform the broader issue of how in-house counsel should address complex 
legal transactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how in-house counsel should address 
complex legal transactions by examining their role in the structuring of 
mortgage-backed securitization transactions. In that context, the Article 
also touches on the professional responsibility of in-house counsel in 
generally dealing with matters of legal risk. The Article begins by 
discussing mortgage-backed securities in the context of the recent 
financial crisis.  
I. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY MBS 
The 2008 financial crisis is closely tied to the securitization of 
subprime, or risky, residential mortgage loans.1 Securitization refers to 
a category of financing transactions in which lenders sell rights to 
payment under mortgage loans, accounts receivable, lease rentals, and 
other types of income-producing “financial assets” to a trust or other 
special-purpose vehicle (an “SPV,” sometimes interchangeably called a 
special-purpose entity or SPE). The goal is to separate the financial 
assets from the risks generally associated with the original lender—
usually called the “originator” to distinguish it from the SPV. The SPV 
issues securities (usually called mortgage-backed securities, or “MBS,” 
when the SPV’s financial assets consist of mortgage loans) to capital 
market investors, using the proceeds to pay the purchase price of the 
financial assets. This funds the originator at a lower cost than if it had 
borrowed the money from a bank or other financial intermediary.2 
Prior to the financial crisis, securitization transactions were 
sometimes backed, at least in part, by subprime residential mortgage 
loans. Because home prices had generally been increasing in the United 
States since the Great Depression, the expectation was that continuing 
home-price appreciation would enable even risky borrowers to repay 
their loans by refinancing their houses. But this model failed when, in 
2007 and 2008, home prices fell significantly. Subprime borrowers, 
who were relying on refinancing for loan repayment, could not 
refinance. Furthermore, many subprime mortgage loans had adjustable 
 
 1. A mortgage loan is a right to payment evidenced by a promissory note 
signed by the borrower, where the note is secured by the lien of a mortgage. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (9th ed. 2009). The term “mortgage” is used in this Article to 
include any security interest in real property supporting the note, including deeds of 
trust and deeds to secure debt in addition to mortgages. 
 2. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION §§ 1:1, 1:3 (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
Investors in the securities expect to ultimately be paid from collections on those 
financial assets. 
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rates that increased after an initial “teaser” period. Borrowers who 
could not afford the rate increases had expected to refinance at lower 
interest rates. That likewise was stymied by collapsing home prices. 
For these reasons, risky borrowers began defaulting, ultimately 
impairing payment on the securities. Investors started losing 
confidence, and the price of MBS plummeted. With the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the loss of confidence extended beyond MBS, 
causing a broader debt crisis and impacting the real economy.3  
II. THE A-B-C-D ARGUMENT  
It has been repeatedly argued in financial and consumer blogs, at 
seminars, and, recently, in the mainstream press that residential 
mortgage-backed securities may be “non-mortgage-backed” securities 
due to failure to comply with contractual requirements of sale.4 
According to these arguments, the law requires that the SPV purchasing 
the mortgage loans5 not only must have a signed contract of sale for 
those loans but also must take physical delivery of the promissory notes 
evidencing those loans (hereinafter, “notes”) in the precise manner 
 
 3. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 
S.C. L. REV. 549, 550–53 (2009).  
 4. See, e.g., Linda Beale, The Mortgage Loan Foreclosure Mess: Yves 
Smith on the Banks' Gluttony; Problems with MERS and Sloppy Securitizations, 
ATAXINGMATTER (Nov. 1, 2010), http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2010/11/yves-
smith-on-the-banks-gluttony.html; Adam Levitin, The Big Fail, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 22, 
2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/11/securitization-
fail.html; Yves Smith, Op-Ed, How the Banks Put the Economy Underwater, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/opinion/31smith.html. 
One argument often advanced is that such transfers also fail to comply with legal 
requirements of sale, as most of the terms of the UCC may be modified by agreement 
of the parties. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001); see also N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-205 
(McKinney 2001). But this simply makes the UCC equivalent to the parties’ contract 
(the sale agreement) and is therefore equivalent to failure to comply with contractual 
requirements. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 N.B.: While Article 9 of the UCC is indeed uniform in relevant part, the other 
articles (in particular, Articles 1 and 3) vary among states. For example, New York’s 
version of the UCC does not contain § 1-302, and its version of Article 3 dates back to 
the 1950s. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW (McKinney 2001). As most of the sales agreements used 
in securitizations are governed by New York law, this distinction may be important, 
though we believe that subsequent revisions of the UCC probably often reflect rather 
than change pre-existing common law and therefore may be good common law in New 
York. Our citations to the UCC itself are to the current version published by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; references to 
individual states’ versions are cited as such. 
 5. This Article does not address the extent, if any, to which that argument 
might apply to other types of financial assets. 
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specified by the sale agreement.6 As the result of the multiple sales 
agreements involved in a typical mortgage securitization, in which the 
loans are typically sold by A to B, by B to C, and by C to D (where A 
is the originator, D the SPV, and B and C intervening parties), this is 
often called the “A-B-C-D” or alphabet argument.7 We adopt that 
terminology in this Article. 
If physical delivery of the notes were not taken in exactly the 
manner specified by the sale agreement, advocates of the A-B-C-D 
argument contend that the SPV would not own and therefore could not 
enforce the mortgage loans.8 The mortgage loans would then revert to 
the originator, which would then have an obligation to refund the 
 
 6. This Article does not address the scenario where, as often, the SPV is a 
New York trust. In that scenario, some argue that the SPV must also take physical 
delivery of the notes and security instruments, even if physical delivery is not required 
by the contract or applicable law (other than New York trust law). New York trust law 
is based, however, on gratuitous trusts (i.e., the law of gifts), which requires delivery 
of the gift because there is no consideration. Therefore, logically, this requirement of 
New York trust law should not apply to a commercial trust such as an SPV. See N.Y. 
C.P.L.R § 7-1.18 (Mckinney 2011) (providing that transfers to a lifetime trust are “not 
accomplished by recital of assignment, holding or receipt in the trust instrument”); 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1-2.20 (Mckinney 2011) (excluding business and investment trusts 
from the definition of “lifetime trust”); see also N. Wooten, 2010 11 12 Memo on NY 
Trust Law and Delivery Issues (Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished) (on file with author) 
(citing only cases involving gifts and transfers without consideration in support of the 
proposition that physical delivery is required to complete the transfer of notes and 
mortgages to a New York trust while acknowledging that assignment may constitute 
delivery). 
 7. There is an ancillary argument to the A-B-C-D argument: that not only the 
notes but also the mortgages securing the notes must be transferred. This ancillary 
argument is much weaker than the A-B-C-D argument because, in most (if not all) 
states, it is clear that collateral follows the debt it secures. See, e.g., Carpenter v. 
Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable . . .. An 
assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter 
alone is a nullity.”). The UCC codified this common law rule. U.C.C. § 9-203(g) 
(1998) (“The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment . . .secured by a 
. . .lien on . . .real property is also attachment of a security interest in the 
. . .mortgage, or other lien.”); see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. 
COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED 
ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES 12 (2011), available at http:// 
www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111311.p
df (confirming same). Our Article will therefore focus solely on the A-B-C-D 
argument. 
 8. Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 19 
(2010) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor, Georgetown University 
Law Center) [hereinafter Levitin Statement]. This might be viewed as a type of 
transactional law failure (i.e., a failure to comply with law or contract in connection 
with a business transaction, as compared, for example, to other types of failures such as 
accounting failures, ultra vires-type failures, and violation-of-law failures). 
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purchase price paid by the MBS investors, plus interest, less any 
distributions on the mortgage loans.9  
Such a reversion would create chaos. It would be difficult if not 
impossible to calculate and allocate the refund payments, and few 
originators would have the wherewithal to pay such refunds. Indeed, 
many if not most originators of subprime mortgage loans are now 
insolvent or close to insolvency.10 In cases where the originator no 
longer exists and its obligations have not been assumed by a successor, 
ownership of the mortgage loans would become unclear, clouding title 
not only to those loans but also possibly to the underlying property.  
Such a failure to transfer the mortgage loans to the SPV would 
also create serious tax issues, even if they were subsequently 
transferred in accordance with the A-B-C-D argument to cure the 
ownership issue. The SPV would not qualify for the entity-level tax 
exemption as a real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) if it 
failed to gain ownership of the mortgage loans at or within ninety days 
of closing.11 Absent another exemption from taxation, the SPV would 
then be subject to an entity-level tax, which would reduce net payments 
to investors in its securities. In the case of transfers of mortgage loans 
more than ninety days after closing, there would be a tax of one 
hundred percent of the value of the transferred assets.12  
In a related but distinct argument, even if the SPV (or its agent, 
such as a servicer) owned and had possession of the notes, proponents 
of the A-B-C-D argument contend that the SPV could not enforce the 
mortgage loans unless the notes were indorsed in the precise manner 
specified by the sale agreement. Their rationale is that notes that are not 
indorsed in accordance with the sale agreement should be presumed to 
 
 9. Id. at 20. 
 10. Worth Civilis & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have 
Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http:// 
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html#top (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 11. See Scot J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax Penalties on Mortgage Securities, 
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-usa-mbs-
taxes-idUSTRE73Q7UX20110427 (discussing potential REMIC violations and 
contrasting the views of James Peaslee and Adam Levitin on whether the Internal 
Revenue Service will pursue enforcement of alleged REMIC violations). 
 12. Id. The A-B-C-D argument maintains that the mortgage loans have not 
been transferred and, apparently alternatively, that the notes (rather than the mortgage 
loans) are the actual assets and therefore cannot be delivered more than ninety days 
after closing; that would render the SPV unable to cure its ineligibility for REMIC 
treatment (and, indeed, its lack of ownership of any assets). See Adam J. Levitin & 
Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 n.35 (2011). 
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be fraudulent.13 Moreover, if the notes are indorsed to a servicer or 
other collection agent rather than to the SPV, proponents of the A-B-C-
D argument contend that the indorsee is not a real party in interest and 
therefore should not be able to enforce the notes. We view this as an 
evidentiary issue based on the procedures that were (or were not) 
followed in transferring an individual loan, rather than a structural 
argument that the SPV does not own the mortgage loans at all. As such, 
this evidentiary issue may well have merit in particular cases.14 
In this Article, we first analyze the merits of the A-B-C-D 
argument. We then analyze whether in-house counsel of clients that 
structure or invest in mortgage-securitization transactions should have 
anticipated the controversy spurred by that argument. Thereafter, we 
analyze what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert—
or, after it arose, to mitigate—the controversy. Finally, we examine 
how the foregoing analyses can help inform the broader issue of how 
in-house counsel should address complex legal transactions.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Process of Transferring Mortgage Loans into SPVs 
To understand the merits of the A-B-C-D argument, one needs to 
first understand the process by which mortgage loans are transferred to 
SPVs. In securitization transactions, the transfer occurs pursuant to 
contracts variously known as pooling and servicing agreements (usually 
referred to as PSAs), sale and servicing agreements, mortgage loan 
purchase agreements, and the like. Because the contract (following 
standard legal definitions) defines the mortgage loan to include the note 
 
 13. See, e.g., Yves Smith, 4ClosureFraud Posts Lender Processing Services 
Mortgage Document Fabrication Price Sheet, NAKED CAPITALISM (Oct. 3, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/10/4closurefraud-posts-docx-mortgage-
document-fabrication-price-sheet.html (suggesting that the failure to establish proper 
chains of endorsement led some financial firms to turn to forgeries and other fraudulent 
methods to establish their right to foreclose on mortgages). 
 14. See, e.g., Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Kemp), 440 
B.R. 624, 628–29 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010), (finding that the debtor’s note was never 
transferred from Countrywide to Bank of New York, which had filed a proof of claim 
against the debtor for the note); U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n v. Ibanez, No. SJC 10694 
(Mass. Jan. 7, 2011); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Francis, No. 50423(U), slip 
op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011) (dismissing foreclosure action with prejudice 
because plaintiff could not demonstrate that it owned the mortgage and note when it 
initiated the foreclosure action). 
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and the mortgage, the sale of the mortgage loan includes the sale of the 
note and the mortgage.15  
The A-B-C-D argument pertains primarily to mortgage-
securitization transactions entered into since 2001. Uniformly effective 
July 1, 2001, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was 
amended to govern the sale of promissory notes16 and to provide that 
their sale—which would include the sale of any collateral (such as 
mortgages) securing the notes17—could be effected merely by the seller 
signing a sale agreement describing the notes, without indorsement or 
delivery of the notes.18 The buyer would then automatically be 
protected from most third-party claims.19 
Nonetheless, because promissory notes traditionally have been 
(and under the amended Article 9 continue to be)20 transferred by being 
indorsed and physically delivered (and indeed Article 9 provides that 
the rights of subsequent transferees of notes can sometimes trump the 
rights of owners of the notes who do not actually hold them directly or 
through an agent),21 parties to these contracts were concerned that the 
SPV’s rights to the notes might become subordinate to the rights of 
third parties who, for whatever reason, actually receive the indorsed 
notes. In order to protect the SPV and its MBS investors, the contracts 
 
 15. This is achieved through a sentence known as the Granting Clause, which 
generally states that the originator sells, transfers, assigns, grants, and conveys to the 
buyer all its right, title, and interest in and to the mortgage loans. 
 16. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (1998). Under this amendment, which was officially 
proposed in 1998, the UCC also governs the sale of payment intangibles such as the 
mortgage loans in the same manner as promissory notes. Although this both clarifies 
and incorporates into law the longstanding practice of selling mortgage loans by 
contract, we do not address this provision in our Article because the A-B-C-D argument 
and the mortgage-note controversy consider only the notes. N.B.: Article 9 has 
subsequently been revised, but those revisions have not been adopted by all relevant 
jurisdictions, whereas the 1998 amendment has been enacted by all fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Our citations refer to 
the 1998 amendment that became effective in 2001 rather than the subsequent revisions 
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
 17. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 7 (1998). 
 18. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).  
 19. See § 9-309(4) (providing that a sale of a promissory note is automatically 
perfected); cf. infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing third-party claims 
of certain purchasers). 
 20. See § 9-203(b)(3)(B). 
 21. Promissory notes are “instruments” under Article 9 and as such may be 
“transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” § 9-102(47); 
§ 9-102(65) (defining a promissory note as an instrument). The sale of promissory 
notes is also governed by § 9-109(a)(3). The rights of purchasers of promissory notes 
who do not (directly or through an agent) take possession of the notes are subordinate, 
however, to the rights of a purchaser of the notes who gives value and takes possession 
of the notes in good faith and without notice of the prior ownership. § 9-330(d). 
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therefore generally provided for delivery and indorsement of the notes 
to the SPV or its agent. To this end, a typical contract would require 
that “in connection with the sale,” the notes be delivered to the SPV (or 
its agent, the document custodian), indorsed or assigned as specified by 
the contracts. We will call this requirement the “delivery instructions.”  
The delivery instructions also were intended to enable the SPV or 
its agent to actually enforce the notes, where appropriate. State law 
generally requires that any person seeking to enforce a promissory 
note—and, by extension, foreclose on a mortgage securing the note—
must have physical possession of the note.22 As before, the delivery 
instructions continue to safeguard the SPV’s interests. 
Unfortunately, over the years procedural standards in mortgage 
securitizations appear to have deteriorated along with loan-underwriting 
standards. As a result, in some, if not many or most, cases, notes were 
neither indorsed nor delivered to the SPV or its agent in accordance 
with the delivery instructions.23 Moreover, it appears that mortgage 
loan servicers seeking to enforce notes on behalf of the SPV did not 
always bother to take physical possession of the notes in accordance 
with state law.24  
As home foreclosures skyrocketed, the consumer bar learned about 
securitization of mortgage loans. They located securitization sales 
agreements and parsed their provisions, reading the delivery 
instructions as necessary to—rather than merely protective of—the sale 
of the mortgage loans to the SPV (in other words, creating a 
conditional rather than absolute sale of those loans).25 To this end, they 
 
 22. See U.C.C. § 3-301 (1990) (specifying person entitled to enforce an 
instrument); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21) (2001) (defining “holder” as person in possession 
of an instrument). 
 23. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Howley, Foreclosure Errors Cloud 
Homeownership with ‘Blighted Titles’, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 1, 2010, 5:35 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-01/foreclosure-errors-cloud-homeownership-with-
millions-of-blighted-titles-.html. 
 24. See infra note 77. Some mortgage servicers appear simply to have printed 
photocopies of the note. Kate Berry, Robo-Signing Redux: Servicers Still Fabricating 
Foreclosure Documents, AM. BANKER (Aug. 31, 2011, 5:47 PM), http:// 
www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_170/robo-signing-foreclosure-mortgage-
assignments-1041741-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1. Indorsement or 
assignment of those copies with the intent to enforce is now known as “robo-signing,” a 
type of fraud. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 452 B.R. 319, 321 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Debtors filed a complaint against Deutsche Bank (and 
IndyMac) to set aside the foreclosure sale [of their home]. They alleged that the 
purported assignments [of the mortgage] from IndyMac to Deutsche Bank were flawed 
because they did not comply with the terms of the PSA. According to the Debtors, this 
rendered them invalid.”); In re Samuels, 415 B.R. 8, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) 
(“[T]he Debtor contends that the PSA required that all mortgages acquired thereunder 
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argued (among other things) that because the UCC may be varied by 
agreement,26 the delivery instructions actually modified the UCC to 
require that the notes must be indorsed and timely delivered to the SPV 
or its agent in order for their sale to be effective and in order for the 
SPV to have standing to enforce the notes.27  
B. To What Extent, If Any, Does the A-B-C-D Argument Have Merit?  
We believe that the A-B-C-D argument has little or no legal merit 
with respect to the structure of mortgage securitizations. Under contract 
law, the question is whether delivery instructions providing that, “in 
connection with the sale,” the notes must be delivered to the SPV or its 
agent indorsed as specified by the securitization contract requires such 
delivery and indorsement in order for the sale to become effective. The 
delivery instructions are not described as conditions to closing the 
securitization transaction or to the sales thereunder, nor are escrows or 
hold-backs established pending proof of satisfaction of the 
instructions.28 Rather, those instructions appear to be intended to 
protect the SPV and its investors, not to invalidate their rights if the 
instructions were not complied with.29  
We have already explained how commercial law, which is 
governed by the UCC, enables the sale of the mortgage loans without 
delivery and indorsement of the notes. The only remaining question—
 
had to be funneled to Deutsche Bank, as pool trustee, through the entity designated by 
the PSA as ‘depositor,’ ARSI. A failure to follow this protocol . . .would, the Debtor 
contends, constitute a breach of the PSA . . ..”); cf. Adam Levitin, Standing to Invoke 
PSAs as a Foreclosure Defense, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 4, 2011, 7:05 PM), http:// 
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/07/standing-to-challenge-standing.html 
(“Adherence to the PSA determines whether there was a transfer effected or not 
because under NY trust law (which governs most PSAs), a transfer not in compliance 
with a trust’s documents is void.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 26. The UCC states that, with certain limitations, “the effect of provisions of 
[the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.” U.C.C. § 1-302(a) 
(2001). 
 27. Levitin Statement, supra note 8, at 12. They also argued that any notes 
indorsed in a manner that did not conform to the sales agreements were presumptively 
invalid. Cf. Adam Levitin, Do We Have a Fraud Problem? The Case of the 
Mysteriously Appearing Allonge, CREDIT SLIPS (Jun. 16, 2011, 8:43 PM), http:// 
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/do-we-have-a-fraud-problem-the-case-of-the-
mysteriously-appearing-allonge.html. 
 28. See, e.g., Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2006-2, Current Report (Form 
8-K) Ex. 10.1: PSA § 2.01 (May 12, 2006) (exemplifying common PSA terms for the 
conveyance of mortgage notes). The delivery instructions still have independent force, 
however, because their breach would enable the SPV to sue under the contractual 
remedies for breach. 
 29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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whether the delivery instructions modified the UCC to require such 
indorsement and delivery—is effectively one of contract interpretation, 
which has already been answered.30  
We next examine whether in-house counsel of clients structuring 
or investing in mortgage-securitization transactions should have 
anticipated and tried to avert the controversy over the A-B-C-D 
argument—which for simplicity we will hereinafter refer to as the 
“mortgage-note controversy.”  
C. To What Extent, If Any, Should In-house Counsel Have Anticipated 
and Tried to Avert the Mortgage-Note Controversy? 
Observers generally recognize that in-house counsel are 
particularly well situated to serve an anticipatory and preventive 
function for their business clients.31 In contrast to outside counsel, who 
typically are too costly to involve in the early stages of a transaction or 
legal issue, in-house counsel are almost always present and can offer 
legal advice early in the decision-making process.32 Also, because in-
 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
 31. E.g., JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 195 (2006) (“[T]he inside counsel is uniquely positioned to 
specialize in preventive law.”); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate 
Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1985) (“The general 
counsel, as a part of senior management . . .has both the right and responsibility to 
insist upon early legal involvement in major transactions that will raise significant legal 
issues.”); Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and 
Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1116 (1997) (“[T]oday’s general counsel 
is much more concerned with forward-looking, systematic features of corporate law 
compliance.”); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional 
Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 519 (1989) (“As in the 
management of outside counsel, in preventive law practice, corporations rely on inside 
counsel to implement and determine corporate interests.”); Omari Scott Simmons & 
James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House Counsel Role, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 115 (2011) (explaining that in-house counsel possesses traits 
“essential to practicing strategic preventive law”). Several significant judicial opinions 
also suggest, without explicitly recognizing, a special preventive role for in-house 
counsel. While considering the extent of attorney-client privilege in the corporate 
context, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the privilege exists to “encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Additionally, in 2009 Delaware’s high 
court explicitly held that corporate officers, including general counsel, owe fiduciary 
duties to their corporation. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). 
 32. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 280; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 
31, at 115. In companies with small in-house legal departments, however, transactional 
work may be outsourced to outside counsel even in the early stages of a transaction or 
legal issue. That would limit in-house counsel’s oversight role. Email from Gabe 
Shawn Varges to Steven L. Schwarcz (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Varges Email] (Gabe 
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house counsel only serve a single client,33 they benefit from superior 
information about that client’s organization, operations, and business 
culture.34 This information is also “dynamic” in the sense that, at any 
given time, in-house lawyers know whom in their company to contact 
about an issue as well as the status of ongoing projects.35 Furthermore, 
their knowledge of the law equips in-house counsel to educate corporate 
employees about potential legal issues and avoid costly compliance 
problems.36 
A crucial qualifier must be added to the informational superiority 
of in-house counsel: the information they receive from corporate 
management is heavily dependent on the nature of their relationship 
with such management. Lawyers who question business decisions too 
often, or who seem overly cautious, risk being perceived as obstacles to 
deal-making and are liable to be frozen out of information channels 
within the organization.37 Thus, the theoretical information advantage 
of an in-house lawyer can be constrained by the lawyer’s ability to 
forge relationships within the company and even by the vicissitudes of 
office politics.38 To be most effective, in-house counsel need to be—and 
to be seen by their clients as—members of the corporate “team”: 
working towards the same goals, even when their role on the “team” 
seems to be in conflict with a business group’s particular wishes. 
In-house counsel are also well-situated to guard the long-term 
interests of the company against the possibly short-sighted behavior of 
management. The interests of line personnel are not inherently opposed 
to the long-term interests of their company; indeed, their interests are 
obviously linked in many fundamental ways. However, compensation 
 
Shawn Varges is an international lawyer who has held senior in-house legal and 
compliance positions with companies in the United States and Europe). 
 33. Albeit a complex client, generally speaking. Simmons & Dinnage, supra 
note 31, at 111–12.  
 34. Id. at 113–14.  
 35. Id. at 114. 
 36. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284; Gruner, supra note 31, at 1157–
58. In-house counsel’s knowledge of both the law and their client-employer’s business 
offers them a “dual competency,” magnifying the value of their advice and education 
efforts. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 114, 117–18. 
 37. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and 
Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 457, 471 (2000). 
 38. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. This type of tension is one of 
the reasons for the emergence of dedicated compliance departments in many companies. 
Varges Email, supra note 32. On the emergence of compliance functions generally, see 
Gabe Shawn Varges, The Compliance Side of International Legal Practice, in CAREERS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6, 6–8 (2003–04) [herinafter Vargas, Compliance Side]; Gabe 
Shawn Varges, Emerging International Indicators for Compliance Function 
Expectations, LexisNexis, 2010 Emerging Issues 4906 (Mar. 2010), at 2–3.  
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structures that reward accomplishing short-term goals, like the 
successful negotiation of a deal or the execution of an asset transfer, 
can create perverse incentives for managers.39 In-house counsel, 
however, are not subject to the same incentives as managers because 
their compensation is typically not linked to transactional volume or 
quantitative performance measures. To that extent, they serve as a 
counterweight to managers, guarding against short-term myopia as part 
of their preventive role.40 
External factors also make the anticipatory and preventive 
functions of in-house counsel increasingly important. The increasing 
scope and complexity of business regulation necessitates vigilance by 
in-house counsel to guide corporate management through a forest of 
legal regimes and regulations.41 In-house counsel are also increasingly 
conscious of the reputational harm their companies can suffer as a 
result of legal problems.42  
As our analysis next shows, if in-house counsel serve special 
anticipatory and preventive functions within their clients,43 they 
 
 39. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of 
Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460 (2009). For 
example, financial firms using the value-at-risk model offered bonuses to secondary 
managers whose transactions were profitable and low in risk. Id. This incentivized 
some managers to offset risk with credit default swaps and other hedging devices with 
low probabilities of failure, but high costs in the event of default. Id. 
 40.  Varges observes that in-house counsel sometimes are still rewarded based 
in part on the completion of transactions. Varges E-mail, supra note 32. He also 
observes, in arguing for better internal company oversight of compensation systems, 
that “[o]ne of the most striking features of the recent financial crisis was the near total 
absence of evidence of control functions playing a material role in their companies’ 
remuneration systems.” Gabe Shawn Varges, Governing Remuneration, in 
SCHWEIZERISHCE BANKRECHTSTAGUNG 2011: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49, 72 (Susan 
Emmenegger ed., 2011), available at http://www.ibr.unibe.ch/unibe/ 
rechtswissenschaft/ibr/content/e8891/e8893/e10096/files10105/SBT11_TB_Inhalt_defin
itiv_rk.pdf. 
 41. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284; Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 
31, at 99–106. 
 42. See Gruner, supra note 31, at 1119. 
 43. At least one prominent observer strongly argues that in-house counsel 
should do their best to forecast legal trends and incorporate those trends into a client 
company’s strategic business planning: 
[T]he corporate counsel must be a futurist, a seer. Counsel must use his 
legal foresight to discern trends in the law and to predict how those trends 
will impact the company’s business over time. Understanding legal trends, 
however, is not enough; the lawyer must also understand business dynamics 
and societal demographics. . .. The forward-looking corporate counsel who 
identifies trends, evaluates the likelihood of occurrence, devises legal 
solutions to probable changes, and alerts management to the changes for 
purposes of devising business strategies in response to them will make a key 
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certainly should have tried, at least as an aspirational goal, to alert their 
clients to the mortgage-note controversy and its potential reputational 
and litigation costs—assuming they were able to foresee the 
controversy.44 First, however, we should consider whether in-house 
counsel had any obligations under existing professional standards.  
Under those standards, lawyers, including in-house counsel, are 
expected to render “competent” services with the “legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”45 They can fulfill this duty by advising their client in 
good faith after making reasonable efforts to research a given issue.46 
But the duty to be proactive, according to the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, is generally limited to actions needed to prevent 
harmful violations of legal obligations to the client or violations of the 
law: 
 
contribution to the future economic health and well-being of a business 
entity. 
Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1208–
09 (1997). Although in-house counsel’s unique informational and organizational locus 
offers opportunities to proactively manage a client’s legal problems, it also presents 
unique conflicts that call into question the extent to which in-house counsel should 
embrace preventive law practice. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of 
General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 965–66 (2005). Exposure to information 
“back-channel[s]” not available to outside counsel could put in-house counsel in a 
position “that may require uncomfortable choices.” Id. at 966 (quoting Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1018 
(1997) (using the term “water cooler” to describe spaces where “back-channel 
information, office gossip, rumors and portents of future corporate undertakings” may 
be exchanged)). Moreover, attorneys that implement and oversee compliance programs 
at a company may be faced with an ethical challenge when called upon to defend 
corporate actions in their role as advocates. Id. at 965–66. Sung Hui Kim draws 
extensively on psychological research to explain that in-house counsel’s employee 
status, professional role as an agent of the corporation, and desire to be team-players 
may explain their apparent inability or unwillingness to prevent corporate fraud. Sung 
Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1001–34 (2005). These observers raise some troubling 
questions about the ability of in-house counsel to effectively fulfill a preventive role, 
but their inquiries are chiefly directed at preventing corporate malfeasance and fraud. 
Because their unique position specially equips in-house counsel to act preventively, at 
the very least with respect to mundane legal risks, they should attempt to offer 
anticipatory guidance to their employees with a healthy understanding of their limits as 
“seers.”  
 44. See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text (examining whether in-house 
counsel should have been able to foresee the mortgage-note controversy). 
 45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002); see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D 
Attorneys at Law § 203 (2007). 
 46. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 203 (2007). 
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, 
employee or other person associated with the organization is 
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter 
related to the representation that is a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is 
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then 
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best 
interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably 
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the 
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to 
higher authority in the organization . . ..47 
In-house counsel considering the need for physical delivery and 
indorsement of mortgage notes in securitization transactions could well 
have determined in good faith that the delivery instructions were 
intended to be protective and thus did not, at least per se, cause any 
harmful violations of legal obligations to the client or any violations of 
the law.48 And even if in-house counsel determined that a legal 
obligation might have been violated, the ability to cure makes it 
uncertain that a violation would be “likely to result in substantial 
injury” to the client.49 Thus, under existing professional standards, it 
appears that in-house counsel were not obligated to alert their clients to 
the mortgage-note controversy and its potential reputational and 
litigation costs.50  
 
 47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011). 
 48. See supra Part III.A. 
 49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011). Because failure 
to deliver the notes to the SPV could jeopardize the ability of that entity to enforce the 
notes if a third-party gained possession of the instruments, in-house counsel to clients 
who invest in MBS likely had a duty to advise clients on the significance of the delivery 
instructions and indorsements. However, beyond rendering such advice, the lawyers’ 
responsibilities would be limited both formally by the scope of the rules and practically 
by their limited ability to monitor third-parties to a transaction. Indeed, on the investor 
side of such transactions, in-house counsel’s organizational and informational 
advantages are effectively negated because the compliance obligations rest with other 
parties to the transaction or even third-parties. 
 50. Varges observes that these existing professional standards, which he refers 
to as the “advisory model of lawyering,” are generally consistent with professional 
standards internationally. Varges E-Mail, supra note 32. Furthermore, although the 
advisory model serves companies well for the provision of normal in-house legal 
services, Varges argues that it is less apt for a more preventive role. Id. He advocates 
for companies using compliance officers who can operate beyond this model to engage 
in more preventive activities and who are better positioned to challenge management on 
matters that, although legal, may be inconsistent with the company’s values or represent 
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If in-house counsel learned that delivery instructions were not 
being complied with, they nonetheless might have wished to bring that 
lapse to the attention of their corporate client. The extent to which they 
should urge the client to comply would be a matter of judgment, 
however, balancing the legal risk from non-compliance (which would, 
as discussed, have appeared remote before the crisis) against the 
potential to be perceived as obstructing transactions and imposing 
needless expense.51 Lawyers faced with this balancing should try to 
avoid achieving a Pyrrhic victory—ensuring compliance with the 
delivery instructions but undercutting their authority to tackle future 
issues by eroding management’s trust in their judgment and 
performance.52  
Some observers suggest that corporate attorneys, including in-
house counsel, should also adhere to a higher standard of care 
commensurate with their specialized technical knowledge and ability to 
forestall legal problems, and that such duty should extend to the 
public—including public financial markets. Professor John Coffee, for 
instance, argues that in-house counsel and other corporate attorneys 
should act as “gatekeepers” in some circumstances,53 using their critical 
position within an organization to prevent wrong-doing and serving as 
“reputational intermediar[ies],” offering markets tacit information 
about the quality of a corporation or its securities.54 In this role, 
corporate lawyers would benefit not only their client, but also third-
 
a reputational risk. See generally Varges, Compliance Side, supra note 38. To that end, 
we next discuss more normative approaches to in-house counsel responsibilities. 
 51. And of course in-house counsel’s answer might change as they learned 
both the extent and costs of non-compliance as the crisis developed. 
 52. It is important to correctly choose whom to report to within the client 
company; because secondary managers may be conflicted, see supra note 39 and 
accompanying text, in-house counsel can face a reporting-up problem, Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Role of Lawyers in the Global Financial Crisis, 24 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 
214, 220 (2010) (observing that since the duties of corporate lawyers are to the 
organization as client under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.13, such 
lawyers should report to the senior managers and directors who are better incentivized 
to act on behalf of the company as a whole). 
 53. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2. Reinier Kraakman developed the concept of 
gatekeepers by considering when liability should be imposed on third-parties who failed 
to prevent misconduct they could have disrupted by failing to cooperate with 
wrongdoers; usually by withholding specialized, professional services. See generally 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986). 
 54. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2. In the legal services context, reputational 
effects are often considered less directly applicable to in-house counsel themselves than 
to the outside law firms that clients retain for transactions and other matters. See Steven 
L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. 
CORP. L. 497, 510–12 (2008). Empirical data cast some doubt on this assumption, but 
are not definitive. Id. at 519–22. 
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party investors who rely on an assumption that companies act on the 
basis of quality professional advice to minimize their legal risk.55 In-
house counsel are specially equipped to fill this role by virtue of their 
access to information about the client and their familiarity with its 
organization and its business practices.56 The gatekeeper role implies 
special responsibilities for corporate and in-house counsel beyond the 
zealous advocacy for one’s client expected of litigators.57 
Judge E. Norman Veasey and Christine Di Guglielmo further 
argue for a “persuasive counselor” model,58 in which lawyers, 
especially in-house counsel,59 should “affirmatively, proactively, and 
courageously try to persuade their clients to follow the law, to go 
beyond mere compliance with the law, and even to ‘do the right thing’ 
 
 55. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 2–5. One scholar has recently developed a 
theory that raises questions about the efficacy of gatekeepers in some circumstances, 
arguing that financial transaction failures can result from a “multiple gatekeeper 
phenomenon.” Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1585 
(2010) (introducing this term). Because of the multitude of professionals—he focuses on 
lawyers—involved in complex financial transactions, any given professional has an 
incentive to minimize his role. Id. at 1603; see also Bevis Longstreth, Corporate Law: 
Problems in the Corporate Bar (As It Appears to a Retired Practitioner), MONT. LAW., 
Feb. 2006, at 22, 23 (discussing practitioners’ tendency to narrow their vision “to avoid 
the difficulty of having to say ‘no’” to a client); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1166–72, 1231–32, 1246–48 (2005) (discussing lawyers 
hiding in the shadows of the divisions of responsibility). He also argues that the 
multiple gatekeeper phenomenon allows clients to position themselves between 
gatekeepers so that no party has complete knowledge of transactions. Tuch, supra, at 
1603–04 (discussing the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch as an 
illustration of this concern). Although that argument incongruously assumes that the 
companies themselves wish to court failure, it might have some explanatory power in a 
fraud. That argument, however, fails to resolve, at least in the context of legal 
gatekeepers, why in-house counsel do not fill the gap of outside counsel as gatekeepers. 
Indeed, in-house counsel should be positioned to see the totality of a transaction and 
prevent their corporate clients from exploiting gaps between gatekeepers. See infra 
notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the need for in-house counsel to have 
full access to information about a client’s business and transactions). 
 56. See COFFEE, supra note 31, at 195. 
 57. See id. at 193. Coffee recognizes difficulties in applying the gatekeeper 
role to attorneys, such as the inherently imprecise nature of legal opinions, conflicts 
with lawyers’ advocacy role, and the possible chilling effect on attorney-client 
communications. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 353 (2004). However, Coffee 
believes reform can overcome such barriers to make lawyers effective gatekeepers 
where warranted. Id. at 354–55. 
 58. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, 
and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 
30 (2006).  
 59. See id. at 29 (explaining that post-Enron concerns that lawyers were not 
effectively policing their business and accounting clients were directed at in-house 
corporate counsel in particular). 
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from a moral or ethical perspective.”60 Similarly, Professor Robert 
Rosen argues that in-house counsel should “maintain and condition 
managerial discretion” while “convinc[ing] others about what is in their 
own and the corporate interest.”61 This model is consistent with added 
responsibility for in-house counsel based on their superior information 
and influence within an organization, but stops short of recognizing a 
special role for corporate lawyers in protecting the interests of third-
party investors.62 
The gatekeeper and persuasive counselor models63 establish 
potential normative frameworks in which to assess what in-house 
 
 60. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 58, at 30 (emphasis added). The idea 
that in-house counsel should act as “statesman adviser[s],” guiding their clients around 
legal problems and protecting the clients’ long-term interests, has deep roots in the 
American legal tradition, but truly came into its own after the Second World War. See 
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counsel after Enron, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1207–09 (2003) (describing the history of the lawyer-as-counselor 
idea and advent of a theoretical underpinning for it by scholars such as “Lon Fuller, 
Willard Hurst, Hart and Sacks, and Beryl Harold Levy”). 
 61. Rosen, supra note 31, at 524. Rosen continues: 
Practicing preventive law thus requires judgment about the corporate 
processes in which expectations about managerial actions are managed. It 
requires engaging managers, not as an executive with veto power, but as a 
manager among others. The practice of preventive law thus requires a 
willingness to alter one's own expectations and work in a process that the 
lawyer cannot control. Outside counsel are not employed because they 
cannot acquire the necessary convergent expectations and customize their 
work to match and develop corporate commitments to legal compliance as 
efficiently as inside counsel. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 62. See id. at 524–27; see also Gordon, supra note 60, at 1211 (“The notion 
that the counselor's role has to be consistent with the law's public purposes . . .does not 
mean that she must become an informer or enforcement officer. . .. She is perfectly 
entitled to present an innovative view of the law and facts that favor what her client 
wants to do, so long as it is a view that she thinks a judge or other competent law-
maker would actually be likely to accept.”). Gordon goes further than Veasey, Di 
Guglielmo, and Rosen by suggesting that “Independent Counselor[s]” be created to 
serve corporate clients under distinct ethical and professional responsibilities 
commensurate with their function. Id. at 1210. Professor Gordon’s intriguing 
suggestion is beyond the scope of this paper, but his description of the independent 
counselor’s role works quite well as an aspirational archetype for how “persuasive 
counselors” might practice within a company. 
 63. Interestingly, these theoretical constructions of the in-house counsel role 
are paralleled by sociological research carried out by Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 37. 
The authors surveyed a number of in-house counsel to determine how they constructed 
their own role within a company and from there constructed three “ideal types”: the 
“cop” (who primarily policies actors within the organization), the “counsel” (who 
mostly acts in an advisory capacity, blending business and legal advice), and the 
“entrepreneur” (who views legal advice as another source of potential value creation 
for the company). Id. at 462–68. While the overlap between the ideal types and the 
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counsel’s standard of care should be. Gatekeepers, perceiving an 
obligation to the public beyond that to their client,64 should scrutinize 
mortgage-securitization transactions not only for conformity with the 
legal obligations of their clients but also for the potential of legal 
failures to impact financial markets.65 Persuasive counselors should 
affirmatively and proactively watch out for the client’s interest.66 
Whichever overarching theoretical framework is applied, lawyers, 
including in-house counsel, in practice have to decide how to advise 
their clients on legal risk by exercising their professional judgment 
under conditions of uncertainty and in the face of multiple variables.67 
Under the gatekeeper model, counsel would have to exercise this 
judgment by taking into account not only their clients but also the 
public, including possible costs to financial markets. Any such exercise 
of judgment would necessarily be highly subjective.68 To attempt to 
 
theoretical frameworks is not perfect, see id. at 470–71, the similarities between the 
two sets of models is striking. 
 64. There is a long history of contentious debate surrounding the extent to 
which lawyers owe duties to the larger public; for a summary of this debate, see Steven 
L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 14–17 (2005). Where lawyers encounter intrinsically unlawful transactions, 
it is reasonable to suppose they have a duty to protect the public from the negative 
externalities that could result. See id. at 24–25. However, imposing broader duties to 
the public could force lawyers to second-guess the business decisions of their clients; a 
role for which they generally lack adequate information and training. See id. at 29. 
Although in-house counsel might be better-positioned to make these judgments given 
their knowledge of the client company, creating dual obligations for in-house counsel 
would still likely create inefficiencies and allow lawyers to use ill-defined duties to 
“pursue their own ideological goals in favor of client interests.” Sean J. Griffith, 
Afterward and Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market Investors, 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 1223, 1234 n.43 (2003). 
 65. See Coffee, supra note 57, at 360–61 (explaining that what sets attorneys 
as gatekeepers apart from advocates are “(1) a need for greater independence from the 
client; (2) a recognition of a duty to the public; and (3) professional skepticism”). 
 66. One observer even suggests that American in-house counsel, in particular, 
tend to be more proactive as a result of their emergence from a culture that encourages 
entrepreneurialism, that values lawyers as business, political, and civic leaders, and that 
makes use of a distinctive adversarial legal system. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, 
Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the 
General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1068–78 (1997). 
 67. See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
367, 368–69 (2009) (describing law practice as, in part, an exercise in “risk 
management” rather than an exact, predictive science). 
 68. One of us thus observes that, in practice, because in-house counsel’s 
direct responsibility to the public is limited to that imposed by law and the rules of 
ethics, it might be useful to begin thinking of this wider obligation as indirect: counsel 
has, of course, a direct fiduciary obligation to their corporate client, but that client also 
has responsibilities to the public to comply with the law and even to be a good 
“corporate citizen.” In-house counsel’s role, then, includes a fiduciary obligation to 
help the corporation define as well as fulfill those responsibilities. Kathleen Cully, 
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provide some guidance, Professor Richard Gruner, a former in-house 
counsel for IBM, proposes factors that in-house counsel should consider 
in determining how much information their corporate clients need to 
make an informed decision on a legal issue.69 These factors include the 
“diversity [i.e., multitude70] of parties” implicated in a legal issue, the 
specific nature and scope of the legal requirements faced by the 
corporate actor, and the “duration of the . . .impact” of the corporate 
decision.71  
Consider how the gatekeeper and persuasive counselor models, as 
informed by Gruner’s factors, could inform the mortgage-note 
controversy. The first question is whether in-house counsel, even under 
those models, should or even could have foreseen the mortgage-note 
controversy. Business managers face substantial time and information 
constraints in their decision-making; therefore their legal information 
needs increase with the amount of legal uncertainty and risk entailed in 
a given decision.72 But it is doubtful that in-house counsel could have 
foreseen the mortgage-note controversy or should have recognized the 
 
Statement at University of Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Who’s in the House? 
The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and General Counsel (Nov. 18, 2011).  
 69. Richard Gruner, Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Counsel: An 
Information Processing Analysis, 9 J. CORP. L. 217, 228–29 (1984). This framework is 
one way to conceptualize the cost-benefit analysis faced by in-house counsel, but there 
are other methods that could be employed to weigh the probability and magnitude of 
legal risk. In the litigation context, models analyzing the trade-offs faced by litigants 
have employed traditional cost-benefit techniques with discounted cash flow analysis, 
see, e.g., John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 
(1973); Steven Shavell, Suit Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982), 
game-theoretic models, see, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement 
under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); I. P. L. P’ng, Strategic 
Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983), and real options 
pricing models, see, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing 
Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, 
The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1267 (2006).  
 70. Gruner, supra note 69, at 228 (explaining that legal risk increases with the 
number and variety of parties affected by a company’s decision since each represents a 
potential source of liability). 
 71. Id. at 228–29. 
 72. Id. at 229.  
When these factors cause uncertainty about legal restrictions to be high, 
corporate decision makers must either obtain the information necessary to 
reduce their legal uncertainty, or accept the substantial risk that a chosen 
course of action will not comply with legal requirements. The greater the 
legal uncertainty associated with a particular decision, the more information 
that must be processed to allow the decision to be made in a legally prudent 
manner.  
Id. 
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alleged legal uncertainty at the heart of the controversy. Mortgage-
securitization transactions were long considered standard, low-risk 
financial transactions73 and would not, by themselves, have raised 
inferences of legal uncertainty or risk. And the structural risk was 
further reduced in 2001, when the UCC was amended to make it clear 
that the sale of promissory notes could be effected merely by the seller 
signing a sale agreement describing the notes.74  
Even though compliance with the delivery instructions would 
increase the SPV’s level of protection against possible third parties who 
might gain possession of the notes and would also facilitate enforcement 
of the notes,75 the decision as to when, and whether, to enforce the 
delivery instructions reflects a business risk. In-house counsel would 
perform even their normative duties under these models by notifying 
the client of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of non-
possession. The fact that compliance with the delivery instructions 
would be needed to enforce the notes should not have been problematic; 
such instructions could later be complied with as to notes that need to 
be enforced. Thus, even if one assumes that in-house counsel are 
responsible for post-hoc monitoring of transactions after the closing,76 
the fact that the delivery instructions were not initially complied with 
would not necessarily have been a red flag signaling wrongdoing or 
error.77  
The second question assumes in-house counsel could have foreseen 
the possibility of the mortgage-note controversy and asks what in-house 
counsel should have done about it. Although mortgage-securitization 
transactions were of relatively long duration and were engaged in by a 
multitude of parties with large amounts of money at stake, there seemed 
to be little or no litigation risk because the transactions appeared to be 
(and indeed likely were) in compliance with applicable law. Any 
litigation that might subsequently be commenced would therefore likely 
be viewed, at that time, as extremely unlikely to succeed. There 
remains, however, a question as to whether in-house counsel should 
have anticipated the extent to which the mortgage-note controversy 
might become a matter of public interest or be politicized.  
 
 73. Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage 
Market and Mortgage Finance, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 31, 
36. 
 74. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 76. For a discussion of whether in-house counsel should be responsible for 
post-hoc monitoring, see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 77. Indeed, it appears that, in at least some mortgage-securitization 
transactions, the notes may not have been physically delivered. See supra note 14. 
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In answering this question, it is important to recognize that the vast 
majority of mortgage-securitization transactions were executed prior to 
housing prices plummeting in late 2007.78 Only thereafter did the trickle 
of mortgage-related lawsuits become a torrent and mortgage-
securitization transactions suffer billions of dollars in losses,79 creating 
a much more serious problem.80 Prior to that dramatic shift in the 
financial and political landscape, the specter of claims based on the 
failure to physically deliver mortgage notes might well have been 
judged chimerical. Likewise, the idea that such claims would gain 
substantial political traction and prompt a public controversy that would 
itself drain a client’s goodwill and resources would have appeared 
highly unlikely.81  
It therefore appears, even under the gatekeeper and persuasive 
counselor models as informed by Gruner’s factors, that in the unlikely 
event in-house counsel had foreseen the possibility of the mortgage-note 
controversy, such counsel should have had no duty to do anything about 
it other than perhaps to include that possibility when informing the 
client of possible consequences of non-possession. An in-house counsel 
might also have decided to alert the client to the possibility, albeit 
remote, that arguments might be politicized. Even breach of a mere 
technicality can engender strategic litigation under the right 
circumstances,82 and “early interception of . . .[a problem] is much 
 
 78. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS IN 
2010, at 36 (2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/21846/ 
MMErevised81011.pdf (observing that private-label MBS issuance peaked in 2005 at 
about $1.2 trillion while issuance in 2010 was only about $60 billion, with similarly 
diminished quantities issued in 2008 and 2009). 
 79. See, e.g., Kerry E. Grace, Moody’s Raises Estimate for Subprime 
Losses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at C3; Yalman Onaran, Banks’ Subprime Losses 
Top $500 Billion on Writedowns, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY&refer
=home. 
 80. Monica Pinciak-Madden & Katya Jestin, Subprime Crisis: The Unraveling 
Promises to Increase the Number of Civil Suits and Criminal Investigations, N.Y. L.J., 
Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.jenner.com/system/assets/assets/2527/ 
original/NYLJ_Jestin_Pinciak_Madden.pdf?1319122463 (noting that more than half of 
the 800 subprime-related lawsuits initiated since 2006 were filed in 2008). 
 81. This paragraph notes an important distinction between the foreseeability of 
a possible legal argument by claimants and an economic and political environment in 
which such claims might be more enduring. Whether and to what extent in-house 
counsel are equipped to forecast the “social, economic, and political factors” that 
impact different areas of law, as some suggest they should, Liggio, supra note 43, at 
1209, is an open question. Certainly the skills required to make such predictions are not 
usually part of the typical training and education of contemporary lawyers. 
 82. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional 
Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 496–97 (2007) (citing survey and anecdotal 
evidence supporting the assertion that money disputes frequently lead to litigation, 
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easier than cleaning up a mess after the fact”83—a mess that 
increasingly includes reputational harm.84 Although there are few 
objective standards to determine, in the abstract, what conduct makes a 
“great” as opposed to a merely “competent” attorney, lawyers, 
including in-house counsel, ideally should strive to serve their clients in 
a manner that exceeds the metes and bounds of their bare obligations. 
Consider next, more generally, the extent to which in-house 
counsel should be responsible for post hoc monitoring of transactions 
after the closing. In-house counsel have limited time and resources to 
bring to bear on problems,85 so they naturally should focus on the more 
important problems that their skills and expertise can help resolve. 
Unless in-house lawyers had reason to believe that delivery instructions 
were inappropriately not being followed,86 monitoring the transfer of 
assets sold after an agreement was entered into would not be among 
their priorities. Nor should it have been, given the standardized nature 
of the transactions involved.87  
In-house counsel should be entitled to presume, absent becoming 
aware of evidence suggesting otherwise, that their clients will act 
rationally. Any other approach would not only be inefficient but would 
risk putting counsel into an adversarial relationship with the client. 
D. What, If Anything, Could In-house Counsel Have Done to Mitigate 
the Mortgage-Note Controversy? 
We next consider what in-house counsel of clients structuring or 
investing in mortgage-securitization transactions could have done to 
mitigate some of the impact of the mortgage-note controversy, once that 
controversy became apparent. To what extent, for example, could in-
house counsel have acted aggressively to identify possible hostile legal 
claims and to offer competing narratives to contrast with the mortgage-
fraud account that helped generate the underlying controversy?  
In-house counsel could have done a lot to mitigate the controversy. 
In-house counsel generally have access to information about their 
 
regardless of contract terms, and that a key responsibility of lawyers as contract 
drafters is to provide a roadmap for parties to follow in a dispute). 
 83. Hazard, supra note 43, at 1021. 
 84. Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 128, 139–40. 
 85. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 37, at 472 (explaining that in-house counsel 
surveyed in their study frequently operate under the dual constraints of limited 
resources and profit pressures). 
 86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2011). 
 87. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (1998). For a discussion of what steps in-house 
counsel could have taken to mitigate the mortgage-note controversy, once they learned 
of it, see infra Part III.D. 
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client’s contracts, business operations, and compliance documents, 
especially if such counsel cultivates a good working relationship with 
senior executives.88  
Better policies and procedures might have helped to mitigate the 
mortgage-note controversy. Survey data from before and after the 2008 
financial crisis suggest that many corporate directors believed their 
companies either lacked risk-management programs or doubted the 
efficacy of systems that were in place.89 In-house counsel might have 
been able to offer more systematic guidelines for future MBS contract 
performance and compliance, clarifying the options. Any such 
guidelines would need to carefully instruct the operational employees to 
avoid the risk that old procedures would continue to be followed or that 
new procedures would be adopted for old transactions. In-house 
counsel should also avoid drafting guidelines that might be argued to 
constitute recognition of errors under prior procedures.90  
These guidelines might have featured management education, 
internal reports, and protocols for investigation.91 In crafting the 
guidelines, in-house counsel need not act alone. Industry associations 
and outside counsel are valuable sources of specialized expertise that in-
house counsel can draw on in crafting a compliance system. For 
instance, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) and the American Securitization Forum publish a variety of 
guidelines and best practices that offer useful foundations for 
compliance programs.92 In industries like real estate securitization 
where actors face similar risks and use similar business models, 
 
 88. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 113 (suggesting that in-house 
counsel “should have the opportunity to be part of the management team”).  
 89. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 
J. CORP. L. 967, 970–71 (2009) (referencing a pre-crisis survey indicating forty-three 
percent of respondents doubted the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies or had not 
implemented them and also a 2008 survey in which more than seventy percent of 
respondents were concerned about their companies’ approach to risk management.)  
 90. The best-case scenario for MBS issuers would have been to redraft 
standard PSAs immediately after the 2001 revision of Article 9 of the UCC since this 
would justify a change in delivery instructions as merely aligning them with the 
redrafted code. 
 91. See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 31, at 118. 
 92. Housing Finance and Securitization Resource Center, SIFMA, http:// 
www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/housing-finance-and 
securitization/resources/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011); Market Standards & Practices, AM. 
SECURITIZATION F., http://www.americansecuritization.com/ 
hub.aspx?catid=19&mainid=5 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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external coordination can ease the burden on in-house counsel seeking 
to establish a compliance regime for their client-company.93 
After establishing guidelines, in-house counsel could have built a 
system for monitoring compliance. Monitoring efforts would 
necessarily have been constrained by the limited time and resources of 
in-house counsel.94 Nonetheless, a monthly spot-check of some 
representative transactions may well have been prudent.  
Of course, even the best compliance program will be of limited 
effectiveness if the client’s employees are ignorant of its major 
components.95 In-house counsel could have designed and implemented 
internal management training programs. Effective compliance education 
can also include non-legal staff in order to offset the limited resources 
of in-house legal departments.96  
When faced with an unexpected legal challenge outside their 
routine practice, in-house counsel often find it efficient to turn to 
outside lawyers for assistance.97 Confronted with the mortgage-note 
controversy, in-house counsel therefore could have retained outside 
counsel to help assess the strengths of potential claims and reputational 
damage, and to consider appropriate legal responses.98 Outside counsel 
would be especially helpful if, for example, management conflicts were 
part of the reason for lapses leading to the controversy.99 Perhaps also 
 
 93. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 285–86 (noting that a “programmatic 
approach” to preventing legal problems is well-suited to repetitive transactions such as 
financings). 
 94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 95. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 31, at 284. 
 96. Id. at 286. 
 97. Id. at 289–90; see also Schwarcz, supra note 54, at 507 (discussing the 
economies of scale offered by outside counsel when a company engages in non-standard 
or particularly large transactions). Outside counsel can also help by increasing 
objectivity. Cf. DeMott, supra note 43, at 968–69 (questioning the ability of in-house 
counsel to objectively assess policies and decisions they participated in making). 
 98. See Schwarcz, supra note 54, at 507 (discussing the economies of scale 
offered by outside counsel when a client company engages in non-standard or 
particularly large transactions). In-house counsel’s supervision of the outside lawyers 
auditing the client-firm would have to be strictly limited in scope since an audit would 
almost certainly implicate some decisions made by in-house counsel themselves. See 
DeMott, supra note 43, at 972. Where a potential conflict exists between in-house and 
outside counsel, the latter should fully investigate the question autonomously before 
revealing their findings to the client and its in-house legal team. However, absent 
indications of outright fraud or illegality, such conflicts pose less of a problem, and 
coordination between in-house and outside counsel auditing mortgage securitization 
firms would likely have been helpful, on balance.  
 99. Cf. Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A 
Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1045 (1997) (suggesting in-
house counsel look to outside representation where there is a potential conflict between 
management and the interests of the company). 
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with the help of outside counsel, in-house counsel could have reviewed 
their client’s mortgage-securitization transactions to look for any 
irregularities.  
Finally, in-house counsel could have been more aggressive in 
publicly countering the claims of critics who alleged that certain 
mortgage-securitization transactions were illegitimate. To a large 
extent, the mortgage-note controversy is a product of the economic and 
political climate produced by the 2008 financial crisis. In-house counsel 
could have offered a narrative different than mortgage fraud to help 
shape the context in which claims against their clients would be 
considered.100 Accurate information is critical because:  
 
[The media] will hop on anything. And the people who are 
assigned are . . .not financial journalists. So many of them 
don’t have a background and don’t really frankly know what 
it is they’re writing about. They don’t really frankly 
understand those stories that they are writing, and they get 
things wrong very frequently; like very, very 
frequently . . .and maybe not wrong enough that it has to be 
retracted, but wrong enough that it creates a misleading 
impression, sometimes on purpose and sometimes by 
accident.101 
 
To this end, it is becoming increasingly routine for in-house 
counsel to large companies, in coordination with management, to help 
develop talking points, press releases, and, more broadly, a strategy for 
engaging with critics in the media.102 
In helping to shape the public narrative, in-house counsel must 
often share privileged and confidential information with public-relations 
staff and even outside consultants.103 Communications with outsiders 
should be treated carefully because the privileged status of information 
 
 100. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 
Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1259, 1270–73 (2009) (examining how public discussion can impact future 
claims and regulatory actions). Beardslee surveyed and interviewed a number of general 
counsel to S&P 500 companies as well as public-relations professionals to gain insight 
into how in-house counsel help to shape the public image of their client companies. Id. 
at 1264–65.  
 101. Id. at 1280–81 (quoting Interview by Michelle Stefano Beardslee, with #2, 
General Counsel, Investment Bank (Feb. 4, 2008), at 13) (articulating a common 
refrain among corporate counsel and public-relations professionals). 
 102. Id. at 1295. 
 103. Id. at 1289–90. 
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is sometimes uncertain and highly context-dependent.104 Similarly, 
documents produced in collaboration with outside consultants might not 
be subject to work-product protection, even when such documents 
discuss possible claims against the client company.105 In-house counsel 
should also carefully monitor public statements to avoid disclosing 
details of pending or potential legal claims and to ensure that any public 
commentary is grounded in good faith legal analysis.  
It should not be beyond the scope of in-house counsels’ role to 
occasionally represent a client’s view to the public, so long as in-house 
counsel first vets that view with the client. In-house counsel also could 
coordinate with industry or trade groups that can act as surrogates in 
public discourse, in order to put forth arguments that such counsel or 
their clients might not feel comfortable making individually.106 
CONCLUSION 
Analyzing in-house counsel’s role and responsibility in light of the 
mortgage-note controversy reveals the constraints under which in-house 
lawyers work while managing legal risk for their clients. Although in-
house counsel are dedicated to a single client-company, are strategically 
positioned to understand the full scope of that company’s operations, 
and are privy to superior networks of information—all of which allow 
them to act preventively—there are some issues that cannot be foreseen. 
Novel claims of questionable merit, like the A-B-C-D theory we assess 
above, are likely beyond the ambit of even skilled attorneys. Even if 
one assumes a high aspirational standard of care like that encompassed 
in the gatekeeper model,107 in-house counsel probably could not have 
 
 104. See Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client—Should 
the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications with Public Relations 
Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 570–78 (2005). 
 105. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business out of Work 
Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1929 (2011). 
 106. See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, SIFMA Q&A REGARDING 
MORTGAGE LOAN TRANSFERS AND SECURITIZATION (2010), available at http:// 
www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital_markets/securitization/securitization/sifma
%20mortgage%20transfer%20and%20securitization%20question%20and%20answers.p
df. 
 107. In this context, it is also important to bear in mind that in-house counsel 
are also in a uniquely difficult position. They are lawyers with only a single client and 
should they be terminated by that client, they would likely find it extremely difficult to 
obtain a new legal position. Cf. In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 829 F. Supp. 1176, 
1189 (1993) (discussing the perceived conflict between a general counsel’s duty to a 
client corporation’s shareholders and his financial dependence on the company’s 
directors). In addition, courts are generally unwilling to provide legal recourse to 
lawyers terminated for “whistleblowing” and other conduct mandated by ethical rules, 
on the basis that such conduct is expected of all lawyers. See Weaver, supra note 99, at 
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predicted the mortgage-note controversy before the financial crisis and, 
accordingly, could not have been expected to warn clients about 
potential claims therefrom.  
More generally, in-house counsel work within budgetary and time 
constraints, coupled with political realities. The role of in-house 
counsel in particular circumstances is thus tempered by reality, taking 
into account such factors as views of then-probable future events, 
consequences, costs, internal dynamics, and personalities. This can 
only be done case by case, guided of course by rules of ethics and law.  
Subject to these constraints, in-house counsel not only help to 
shape the corporate client’s policies to the public but also help the client 
to meet its business targets while complying with law. Weighing these 
competing and often incommensurable goals and strategies is extremely 
challenging, especially given the likelihood that the actions of in-house 
counsel will largely be judged in hindsight by people emphasizing 
success over legal “technicalities” with which they are not familiar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1028–29. Thus, in-house lawyers’ unique and strategic position serving a single client 
also operates as a practical constraint on their ability to act preventively by policing the 
client company. 
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